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Notes
THE POLL TAX: ITS IMPACT ON RACIAL SUFFRAGE
There had been a clamor to outlaw the poll tax by federal action
for years, but more often than not the proposals were for legislative
action. There was a feeling in some quarters, however, that such
action might be held unconstitutional and that a better method would
be a constitutional amendment. Action toward this end began on
the Senate floor on March 14, 1962, and after nearly two weeks of
debate in what was termed the "friendly filibuster" by the southern
Senators, a proposed constitutional amendment to outlaw the poll tax
in all federal elections was favored by a vote of 77-16, fifteen more
votes than the required two-thirds majority.' In 1964, the proposal
was ratified by the thirty-eighth state and became the twenty-fourth
amendment to the Constitution.
The problem of poll taxes in state elections in four states re-
mained. An amendment to the last voting rights bill to eliminate
the tax by statute failed by four votes in the Senate. It was feared
by the majority that the amendment might endanger the consti-
tutionality of the whole bill and that a safer procedure would be to
test the state taxes in the courts. Such tests are now being made.2
It is the intent of this note to examine the impact of poll taxes on
racial suffrage and to determine if these taxes contravene the due
process and equal protection of the law clauses of the fourteenth
amendment, or abridge the right of citizens to vote on account of
race or color in violation of the fifteenth amendment.
Though in recent years most public discussion of the poll tax has
dealt with its use as a means of disenfranchising certain groups, the
term "poll tax" does not, itself, refer to voting. The first and most
famous tax of this name was levied in 1377 in England. It led to the
peasant revolt of Wat Taylor in 1381. Subsequent taxes of this sort
(so called "head taxes" or "capitation taxes") were favorite means
of raising revenue in England until about 1715.3 Indeed, the tax is a
popular one in several American states as a source of municipal
revenue. Though sometimes going under the less politically ex-
I Robinson, This Month's Feature, Cong. Dig., May, 1957, p. 132.
2 Bickell, Congress and the Poll Tax, The New Republic, April 24, 1957, p. 11.
3 XVIII Encyclopedia Brittanica 173 (1953).
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plosive names, "residence tax" or "occupational tax," nearly all states
either permit their municipalities to levy the tax or do so themselves.4
The tax became a prerequisite to voting in ten southern states be-
tween 1889 and 1902. Georgia had enacted a similar statute much
earlier. With the rise of the Populist Party in the West and South
just prior to the turn of the century came the first serious challenge
to Democratic political supremacy. The Populists were a low-income
farmers' party, the first party willing to bargain for the Negro vote.
The intensity of the competition between Democrats and Populists
led to the enfranchisement of many lower class Caucasians and Negroes
who were quite undesirable elements once the Populist threat had
subsided. This led many southern legislatures to amend their state
constitutions to include a number of devices designed to keep the
vote from these classes. The poll tax was one of these.5
II
After the First World War, the tax was abolished by state action
in six of the eleven states, but constitutional amendments to remove
it in Arkansas, Texas and Virginia failed. As permitted by the twenty-
fourth amendment, the tax has remained for state elections in Texas
and Virginia, as well as in Alabama and Mississippi. Arkansas re-
pealed its tax in 1964. Texas (and Arkansas before repeal) requires
only that the tax be paid prior to the election when one wishes to
vote. In Virginia and Mississippi the tax is somewhat cumulative,
and in Alabama a delinquent could accumulate a bill for as much
as thirty-six dollars to be paid prior to voting. This last requirement
was dropped recently, and the tax now has a maximum levy of two dol-
lars in Mississippi. Various exemptions are granted to discharged sol-
diers, the disabled and the aged.6
In Breedlove v. Suttles,7 decided by a unanimous court in 1937,
the Supreme Court sustained, against a fourteenth amendment attack,
a provision of the Georgia Constitution laying down a poll tax as a
requirement for voting. The Court held that:
To make payment of poll taxes a prerequisite of voting is not to deny
any privilege or immunity protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Privilege of voting is not derived from the United States, but is con-
ferred by the state and, save as restrained by the Fifteenth and Nine-
teenth Amendments and other provisions of the Federal Constitution,
the state may condition suffrage as it deems appropriate.8
4 Sause, Municipal Poll Taxes in Pennsylvania, 8 Natl Tax J. 400 (1957).
5 Encyclopedia Brittanica, op. cit. supra note 3.
6 Robinson, supra note 1, at 135-36.
7 802 U.S. 277 (1937).
81d. at 283.
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In Breedlove the petitioner did not allege indigency and inability
to pay the tax. If he had, could the tax have been sustained against
a charge of equal protection of the laws? The fourteenth amendment
offers some protection for the poor. In Griffin v. Illinois9 the Court
upheld the contention that due process and equal protection of the
laws were denied an indigent appellant by failure of the State of
Illinois to provide a free transcript of trial proceedings for appeal.
Justice Black in writing the opinion of the Court, observed:
In criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account of poverty
than on account of religion, race, or color. Plainly the ability to pay
costs in advance bears no rational relationship to a defendant's guilt
or innocence and could not be used as an excuse to deprive a defendant
of a fair trial.... There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial
a man gets depends on the amount of money he has.' 0
But certainly, state statutes which discriminate against the poor
are not unconstitutional per se. Justice Harlan, dissenting in Douglas
v. California, cogently pointed out:
Every financial exaction which the State imposes on a uniform basis is
more easily satisfied by the well-to-do than by the indigent. Yet I take
it that no one would dispute the constitutional power of the State to
levy a uniform sales tax, to charge tuition at a state university, to fix
rates for the purchase of water from a municipal corporation, to impose
a standard fine for criminal violations, or to establish minimum bail for
various categories of offenses. ... Laws such as these do not deny equal
protection to the less fortunate for one essential reason: the Equal
Protection Clause does not impose on the States "an affirmative duty to
lift the handicaps flowing from differences in economic circumstances." 1
But, with the probable exception of Justice Black,12 the Supreme
Court also requires all state regulatory legislation to pass the test of
rationality, i.e., that it be reasonably related to an allowable end.
Aside from its possible value as a revenue measure (the tax brought
in more than 600,000 dollars to the state of Arkansas 3) the states will
argue that the allowable end is the selection of a suitable electorate,
9 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
10 Id. at 18, 19.
11372 U.S. 853, 361 (1963).
See Black's dissent in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 511. "The
due process argument which my Brothers Harlan and White adopt here is based,
as their opinions indicate, on the premise that this Court is vested with power
to invalidate all state laws that it considers to be arbitrary, capricious, unreason-
able or oppressive, or on this Court's belief that a particular state law under
scrutiny has no "rational or justifying' purpose, or is offensive to a "sense of fair-
ness and justice. If these formulas based on natural justice,' or others which
mean the same thing, are to prevail, they require judges to determine what is or is
not constitutional on the basis of their own appraisal of what laws are unwise
or unnecessary. The power to make such decisions is of course that of a legis-
lative body."
13 Robinson, supra note 1, at 147.
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and that the poll tax contributes to this end as much as do qualifica-
tions of literacy, age, residence, or absence of a criminal record. "It en-
sures that the act of voting is deliberate, that the citizen participates
in the process of government not casually, but with a certain will. "14
And if it seems that the tax is ill-designed to achieve that end, the
answer is that:
The doctrine that . . . due process authorizes courts to hold laws un-
constitutional when they believe the legislature has acted unwisely-
has long since been discarded. We have returned to the original con-
stitutional proposition that courts do not substitute their social and eco-
nomic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies who are elected to
pass laws .... It is only "invidious discrimination" which offends the
Constitution.15
Moreover, exercise of police power will be upheld if any state of
facts, either known or which could be reasonably assumed, accords
support for it.1'
HI
It appears then that the poll tax should be upheld again as con-
stitutional under the fourteenth amendments due process and equal
protection of the law clauses. Can the same be said for the validity
of the tax under the fifteenth amendment?
Today arguments against the poll tax generally run along the
lines that it is a white supremacy measure, and as such it is an ob-
stacle to Negro voting. If this is true, more must be shown than
that indigent Negroes are discriminated against along with many
indigent whites; it must be shown that Negroes are discriminated
against as a class.
The Senate debates on the poll tax amendment brought out a
number of statistics which indicate this may be done. In Louisiana
there were 130,000 Negroes registered in 1897 before the poll tax,
but only 5,300 in 1900 and 1,340 in 1904.17 After repeal of the tax
in Georgia the overall voter turnout increased from 16.9 per cent to
30.3 per cent of those eligible to vote. Four years after the abolition
of the tax in Florida the total vote rose 46 per cent, while it rose
12 per cent in Tennessee after repeal.' Opponents of the tax also
point out that Mississippi and Alabama, both poll tax states, are tradi-
tionally at the very bottom in voter turnout.
14 Bickell, supra note 2, at 12.
15 Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730, 732 (1963).
16 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 (1938).
17 Robinson, supra note 1, at 144.
18 Id. at 146.
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Senator Paul Douglas sums up the civil rights argument by say-
ing: "It [the poll tax] was intended to reduce the number of low-
income citizens who could vote. It disenfranchised poor whites as
well as poor Negroes. But since the Negroes were on the average
much poorer than the whites, it disenfranchised more Negroes than
whites."' 9
Defenders of the tax deny that it discriminates in favor of the
white southerner. Senator Fulbright has pointed out that the Civil
Rights Commission "was unable to find any evidence of discrimin-
ation due to existence of the poll tax." Furthermore, the commission
cited only three southern states where Negroes now appear to face
no racially motivated impediments to voting. All three of these
states, Arkansas, Texas and Virginia, had poll taxes at that time.20
There is other evidence that the poll tax is not racially discrim-
inatory. Negro registration is low in all parts of the South, but ap-
parently there can be no distinction made between states with the
poll tax and those without it. Mississippi keeps no statistics with
regard to voter registration where the voter's race is noted, but in
the other four states with the poll tax there were 38.8 per cent of the
eligible Negroes registered to vote. In the six non-poll tax states
there were 84.8 per cent of the Negroes registered.21 If the statistics
from Tennessee, where Negro registration is so disproportionately
high as to render it "out of the South," are excluded (Tennessee has
20 per cent more Negroes registered than the second place state,
Texas), there are actually 2 per cent more Negroes registered in poll
tax states than non-poll tax states.22 Though Negro registration has
increased everywhere in the South in the past ten years, it is up
41.7 per cent more in all five poll tax states than in the six non-poll
tax states.23 A telling argument against poll tax discrimination comes
from Edward Gamarekian's study of white pressure techniques on
the Negro voters in Mississippi. In Mound Bayou, Mississippi, 295
of the 700 Negroes of voting age pay their poll taxes regularly-even
though they realize their votes are never counted.24 Apparently, the
Mississippi Department of Revenue is quite willing for the Negro to
pay his poll tax; there were other effective ways to keep him from
voting.
19 Id. at 144.
20 Id. at 147.
21 How Many of the South's Negroes Really Vote, U.S. News and World
Report, March 28, 1960, p. 44.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.24 Gamareian, A Report from the South on the Negro Voter, Reporter,
June 27, 1957, p. 10.
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If the poll tax is no inhibitor to Negro voting, how can we explain
the very low level of voting pointed out earlier that exists in the
five poll tax states? Economic pressures are one reason. "In the rural
counties, the economy of the Negro is tied so closely to that of the
white man that he is afraid to try to vote."25 Of course, there are the
less subtle methods of literacy tests, challenges to Negroes already
on the voter roles, and straight terrorism. 26 Probably the greatest
inhibitor to Negro voting was apathy brought on by the one party
system, i.e., "the main reason is that the Democrats are so sure of
victory that voters just don't care."2 7 The Negro is more interested
in who gets elected sheriff than who goes to Washington.28 Residence
requirements also take a big toll. In the 1956 Presidential election,
Alabama with 28.5 per cent voting and Mississippi with a 22.1 per cent
turnout were at the bottom of the list. Here residence requirements
were two years, the longest in the nation, and the registration dead-
line was in May and September. By contrast Idaho with 80 per cent
voting and Connecticut with 76.6 per cent led the nation. There was
only a six months residence requirement here, and the two states
allowed registration until three days and two weeks respectively
before the election day.29 If the poll tax does not remain as a serious
obstacle to Negro voting, does it then effect the electorate in any more
subtle way than in its nuisance value?
In the 1930's Huey Long swept into power with the aid of the
neo-populist movement in the South. In 1934 he widened his base
of power with the repeal of the Louisiana poll tax. The average
rate of participation in senatorial primaries increased frrom 31.2
per cent to 46.5 per cent; the increase in gubernatorial primaries was
from 40.2 per cent to 60.1 per cent.30
In 1936 Florida repealed its poll tax, and as noted earlier, there
was a voter turnout increase corresponding to the increase in Louis-
iana. In four years there was an increase of 152,688 votes in the
democratic primary elections or approximately 28 per cent. At this
time Florida still had a white primary. The Negro registration, how-
ever, hovered around the 20,000 mark it had been before repeal
until well into the 1940's.31
25 Negroes Stay Home, Vote Crusade Fails, U.S. News and World Report,
May 2, 1958, p. 52.2 6 Gamarekian, supra note 24, at 9.27Fewer People Voting: Why They Stay at Home, U.S. News and World
Report, August 9, 1952, p. 16.2sNegroes Stay Home, Vote Crusade Fails, U.S. News and World Report,
supra note 25, at 54.29Saturday Evening Post, November 12, 1960, p. 10.80 Seymour Mortin Lipset, Political Man, (New York, 1960), p. 170.8l Robinson, supra note 1, at 146.
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As pointed out earlier, the percentage of registered Negroes is
approximately the same in poll tax and non-poll tax states. In regard
to white voters, however, there are 13.4 per cent more of the eligible
white voters registered in poll tax states than in non-poll tax states.
If figures for Mississippi were available the disparity would doubtless
be much greater. The reader will recall that the state of Tennessee
was excluded from one comparison earlier because its Negro regis-
tration was so far out of proportion to other southern states that it
needed a separate classification. However, excluding Tennessee's
white registration here makes no appreciable difference in the com-
parison, i.e., non-poll tax states still have 12.4 per cent more of their
whites registered than do the poll tax states.32
If we tie together these facts we come to a not very surprising
conclusion: people vote when they have a cause to champion and
when their cause will be helped by their votes. Thus, voter turnout
increased in 1934 in Louisiana for both the poor whites and the
Negroes because their cause was championed by Huey Long. There
was no corresponding increase in the Negro vote in Florida at that
time because the Negro had no cause.
In the present day South the poll tax inhibits the poor white's
voting because he has nothing to gain and a dollar to lose. By
contrast, the Negro can better himself substantially at the ballot box.
Of course, the white southerner has been particularly ingenious
at devising other means of keeping the Negro from the polls, but
if the hypothesis is correct, once the other obstacles are overcome,
the poll tax does not dissuade the Negro, while it does dissuade the
poor white.
The author sought to corroborate his hypothesis by conducting
a poll in one precinct in the city of Lexington, Virginia, in November,
1963. (Virginia, of course, is one of the states which retains the poll
tax.) The precinct is located in northeast Lexington. It is an inte-
grated neighborhood of approximately two Negroes to every white.
The area contains a wide divergence of incomes since it includes some
of the housing for Virginia Military Institute professors along with
a good many shanties giving shelter to those living on relief and
unemployment checks. I interviewed forty-four persons over age
taventy-one who responded to the questions; of these, twelve, or 27/2
per cent, voted regularly. In Virginia, the overall figure has been ap-
proximately 29 percent,3 3 for the past three years. Twenty-one of
32 How Many of the South's Negroes Really Vote, U.S. News and World




my respondents were white, twenty-three were Negro. The following
questions were asked with the following replies:
1. How many times do you think you have voted in the past ten years?
Please check the appropriate box
A. More than five times 11
B. Two to four times 1
C. Never voted at all 32
Thus there were twelve voters (5 whites, 7 Negro) and 32 non-
voters (16 whites, 16 Negro).
2. If you had voted in the last Presidential election, would you have
voted for Kennedy or Nixon?
Kennedy Nixon
Of the 32 non-voters questioned, 16 would have voted for Kennedy,
6 for Nixon, and 10 had no opinion.
3. Do you feel that generally the voters make a wise choice between
the candidates offered them? (This was clarified to mean, are you
generally satisfied with your elected officials?)
Colored
Voters Non Voters Voters
Yes 6 22 4
No 5 5 3
No Opinion 1 5
White Colored White




4. If Virginia did not have a poll tax, do you feel that you would vote?
A. More often
B. About the same number of times
Colored




Voters Non Voters Non Voters
2 4
5 14 12
The obvious conclusion to be drawn from the data is the impotency
of the poll tax to keep anyone from the polls who wants to vote.
This conclusion is true regardless of race and was emphasized again
and again throughout the interviews. On the other hand, the con-
clusion of Senator Douglas is no less obvious. "Even payment of a
dollar or two is a burden for an adult to bear... particularly when
[Vol. 54,
the benefits are at best intangible, and doubtless seem to many to be
illusory."34 The poll tax does show its "deterrent" effect here. But,
following the hypothesis, the deterrent effect seems to lie with the
white non voter more than with the colored non voter.
Turning from the problem of apathy to the problem of dissensus,
it was surmised earlier that dissensus occurred when there was a
great and sudden increase of new voters, as in the Huey Long election
in 1934, or today where Negroes are gaining the vote more rapidly
than whites in the deep South. If we look at responses to question
three the hypothesis is corroborated. Among the twelve voters, five
replied "no" to question three indicating dissatisfaction, i.e., dis-
sensus. In other words 42 per cent of the voters indicated dissensus.
Among non-voters the total was again five, but this was only 15
per cent of the total. Following true to form, three of the five dis-
satisfied non-voters were Negroes.
In correlation with question two not a single Negro who showed
dissensus in question three would have voted for Nixon while two
whites indicated they would have.
Correlating questions three and four, we find that only one re-
spondent indicated both dissatisfaction and at the same time did
not vote because of the poll tax. He was questioned, and he stated
that the deterrent was "principle" not money. He was earning sixty-
five dollars a week as a cook and janitor. Thus, according to the
poll there were only 2.2 per cent of the potential electorate who were
generally dissatisfied with their elected officials and who did not
vote because of the poll-tax.
IV
The thesis of this article has been that the poll-tax is constitutional
under both the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments.
The tax should be sustained under the fourteenth amendment as
either a revenue measure or as a police regulation. Given the Court's
present liberal tests of "rationality" or absence of "invidious discrim-
ination" it should not be difficult for the state to come up with a
legitimate interest which the tax is designed to foster or protect.
The means chosen need have only some plausible or presumable
relevance towards achieving the permitted end.
Sustaining the tax under the fifteenth amendment should involve
no greater challenge. It needs merely be shown that no citizen is
denied the right to vote on account of race. If a poll-tax state grants
each citizen, regardless of his race, the unhindered opportunity to
34 Robinson, supra note 1, at 146.
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pay the tax and if the level of the tax be not so high as to single out
for special privileges or disabilities any ethnic group because of its
economic position, then the tax is constitutional. It is submitted that
the poll-tax states adhere to these requirements. Indeed, it is the
author's conclusion from the statistics available that though there is a
sizeable dissatisfied element in the electorate among poll-tax states,
that the Negro portion of this element tends to vote with greater
frequency than the Caucasian portion. In the study presented there
were nearly three times the number of dissatisfied voters as non-
voters. Of the dissatisfied voters, 60 per cent were Negro. Of the dis-
satisfied non-voters 60 percent were Caucasian. The conclusion from
the data can only be that if a poll tax dissuades any ethnic group from
voting it must be the poorer Caucasians, not the Negroes. It cannot
be contended that the poll-tax discriminates unfairly against Negro
voters as a class in violation of the fifteenth amendment.
John Lackey
